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Determining State Power to Tax Foreign Commerce
Under the Commerce Clause: Wardair Canada,
Inc. v. Florida Department of Revenue
Traditionally, the federal government has had a generous
breadth of power in foreign affairs. Limited state advances into the
foreign commerce domain have, however, been permitted. Although
Congress delegates much federal commerce power through express
statutes, there also exists a variety of international agreements in-
tended to proscribe the law in specific areas of foreign commerce.
Furthermore, states may challenge federal commerce power in areas
not specifically regulated by statutes. When the extent of state
power in this domain is unclear, the U.S. Supreme Court must dis-
cern whether federal law or policy pre-empts state regulation. The
Court addressed this issue in Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Depart-
ment of Revenue. 1
In Wardair, a foreign air carrier challenged the state's power to
tax its purchases of aviation fuel within the state. The state of Florida
had enacted a statute 2 which imposed a sales tax on the purchase of
aviation fuel 3 by both national and foreign air carriers. This tax was
imposed regardless of the amount of business conducted in the state
or whether the purchaser engaged exclusively in interstate or foreign
commerce.
4
Wardair Canada, the foreign carrier, filed suit in Florida Circuit
Court against the Florida Department of Revenue, 5 claiming the
sales tax was unconstitutional and inconsistent with the Nonsched-
uled Air Services Agreement (Air Agreement), a bilateral treaty to
1 106 S. Ct. 2369 (1986) (No. 84-902).
2 1983 Fla. Laws 88-3, § 212.70.
3 The value of the tax assessed was approximately 5% of the retail price per gallon
of fuel. Wardair, 106 S. Ct. at 2371.
4 Section 212.70, 1983 Fla. Laws 88-3 provides:
Tax imposed on sale of motor fuel and special fuel; tax on ultimate
consumer;
(1) A tax shall be imposed for the privilege of the sale at retail in this state
of motor fuel and special fuel.
(2)(a) This levy of tax is upon the ultimate retail consumer.
The sales tax replaced a use tax on national and foreign carriers, prorated according
to the mileage the carrier traveled in Florida airspace. Brief for Appellant at 6, Wardair
Can., Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Revenue, 106 S. Ct. 2369 (1986) (No. 84-902).
5 Wardair Can., Ltd. v. State of Fla. Dept. of Revenue, No. 83-1106 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
July 19, 1983).
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which both the United States and Canada are signatories. 6 The con-
stitutional attack was two-fold. First, Wardair alleged the tax vio-
lated the commerce clause 7 of the U.S. Constitution as an undue
burden on foreign commerce, and pursuant to the supremacy
clause, 8 federal policy pre-empted the state statute.9 In addition,
Wardair claimed that in light of the Air Agreement, the state sales
tax deprived the federal government of its ability to "speak with one
voice" 10 when regulating foreign commerce. 1
The Florida Circuit Court held that although the tax did not vio-
late the commerce clause, it was inconsistent with both the Air
Agreement and a federal policy exempting foreign air carriers from
fuel taxes. 12 The circuit court consequently enjoined the state reve-
nue department from collecting the tax on all foreign air carriers en-
gaged exclusively in foreign commerce. 13
On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court upheld the constitution-
ality of the tax and vacated the injunction.' 4 The court reasoned that
although the Air Agreement expressly prohibited national taxes, Con-
gress did not intend "to preclude the state's power to tax [foreign
commerce]." 15
6 Nonscheduled Air Services Agreement, May 8, 1974, United States-Canada, 25
U.S.T. 787, T.I.A.S. No. 7826 [hereinafter Air Agreement]. Specifically, appellant
Wardair cited the language of article XII:
Each Contracting Party shall exempt the carriers of the other Contracting
Party to the fullest extent possible under its national law from import restric-
tions, customs duties, excise taxes, and other national duties and charges on
fuel ...
The exemptions granted by this paragraph shall apply to items: ...
(c) taken on board aircraft of the carriers of one Contracting Party in the
territory of the other Contracting Party and intended solely for use in
international air services; whether or not such items are consumed
wholly within the territory of the Contracting Party granting the
exemption.
Air Agreement, supra, art. XII.
7 Article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution states that "Congress shall
have power .. . to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
states, and with the Indian tribes,. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
8 U.S. CoNsT. art. VI.
9 Wardair, No. 83-116 at A-21-A-22.
10 The pervasive theme in the foreign commerce clause cases is the Court's concern
for preserving federal uniformity and the federal government's ability to speak with one
voice when regulating foreign commerce. Indeed, the Court in Japan Line, Ltd. v. County
of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979), embodied this theme in its foreign commerce clause
analysis. Id. at 451. See infra note 48 and accompanying text. The Court also recognized
that federal uniformity has constitutional origins. "[In discussing the Import-Export
Clause, this Court, in Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976), spoke of
the Framers' overriding concern that 'the Federal Government must speak with one voice
when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments.' " Japan Line, 441 U.S. at
449.
1 Wardair, No. 83-116 at A-22.
12 Id. at A-23.
13 Id. at A-24.
14 Wardair Can., Ltd. v. Florida Dept. of Revenue, 455 So. 2d. 326, 329 (Fla. 1984).
'5 Id.
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In affirming the state supreme court's decision, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that neither the Federal Aviation Act,' 6 nor its
legislative history,' 7 revealed a congressional intent to prohibit state
taxation of this kind on foreign carriers.' 8 The Court reasoned that
"rather than prohibit[ing] state regulation in the area, Congress in-
vited it."' 19 In reaching its decision, the Court found little merit in
the foreign carrier's contention that there existed a "clear national
policy of exempting aviation fuel from state sales taxes." 20
Justice Blackmun, the lone dissenter, relied on the rationale of
the Court's decision in Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles.21 He
argued that the sales tax would seriously impair the federal govern-
ment's ability to "speak with one voice" 22 in regulating commercial
relations with foreign governments, thus jeopardizing federal uni-
formity in foreign commerce regulation.2 3 Responding to this argu-
ment, the Court explained that foreign commerce clause analysis 24
required a court to "ask whether a state tax prevents the Federal
Government from 'speaking with one voice when regulating com-
mercial relations with foreign governments,' [b]ut. . .we never sug-
gested. . . that the Foreign Commerce Clause insists that the Federal
Government speak with any particular voice."' 25 Thus, something
more than the existence of an "indisputable pattern"26 of federal for-
eign policy is required before the Court will strike down a state tax.
The Supreme Court has not yet directly addressed the constitu-
tional distinction between foreign and interstate commerce and the
extent to which the federal government may regulate commerce in
16 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (1982).
17 "[N]ot only is there no indication that Congress wished to preclude state sales
taxation of airline fuel, but to the contrary, the Act expressly permits States to impose such
taxes." Wardair, 106 S. Ct. at 2372.
18 Id. at 2376.
19 Id. at 2372.
20 Id. at 2374. The Court also concluded that in light of the seventy-odd aviation
agreements it entered into, the United States "has at least acquiesced in state taxation of
fuel used by foreign carriers in international travel." Id. at 2375.
21 441 U.S. 434 (1979). In fact, Justice Blackmun wrote the majority opinion in sev-
eral other recent commerce clause decisions. See also Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v.
Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
22 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
23 Wardair, 106 S. Ct. at 2378 (quoting Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276,
285 (1976)) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
24 The Court's foreign commerce clause analysis refers to the test the Court will ap-
ply to determine the constitutionality of state regulation of foreign commerce. For the
Court's development of this analysis, see infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text. The
Court made an important distinction that "[a]lthough the Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3,
grants Congress power to regulate commerce 'with foreign nations' and 'among the sev-
eral States' in parallel phrases, there is evidence that the Founders intended the scope of
foreign commerce power to be the greater."Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 448. This difference is
the basis for the Court applying an extended analysis of state regulation of foreign com-
merce, as opposed to interstate commerce.
'5 lVardair, 106 S. Ct. at 2375-76.
26 Id. at 2379 (emphasis added).
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this area.2 7 Foreign commerce clause analysis focuses on the practi-
cal effects of state taxation of commerce. 28 The analysis does not,
however, attempt to define the limits of state interference in the for-
eign commerce domain. Instead of creating a uniform doctrine, the
Court has addressed the constitutionality of state regulation of for-
eign commerce on a case-by-case basis. To understand the signifi-
cance of the Court's more recent foreign commerce decisions, it is
necessary to examine briefly the development of commerce clause
analysis.
The early cases primarily considered the impact of state regula-
tion on interstate commerce.2 9 As the means of interstate and for-
eign commerce became more sophisticated, so did the state
challenges to federal commerce power. Since its decision in Gibbons
v. Ogden,30 the Supreme Court has tried to reconcile the conflicting
interests of state protectionism and federal uniformity. 31 Although
state interference with interstate commerce can take many forms,
one of the more frequently used methods by which states sought to
protect their own economies was the taxing power.
Early in this century, the doctrine of constitutional or "per se"
immunity from state taxation was frequently invoked to protect inter-
state commerce. 32 More recently, per se immunity has been re-
27 See supra note 24. As one commentator suggests, "[a]lthough there is some evi-
dence that the constitutional grant of power to the federal government was intended to be
greater with respect to foreign commerce than with respect to interstate commerce, the
juxtaposition of the two provisions in the Commerce Clause argues for their equation."
Comment, State Taxation of International Air Carriers, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 94, 101 (1962).
28 See infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
29 See infra note 32.
30 22 U.S. 1 (1824). ChiefJustice Marshall ensured that Congress received a gener-
ous grant of discretion in describing its regulatory role:
[T]he power [of Congress to regulate] over commerce with foreign nations,
and among the several States, is vested in Congress as absolutely as it would
be in a single government, having in its constitution the same restrictions on
the exercise of the power as are found in the constitution of the United
States.
Id. at 197.
31 One of the early cases to emphasize a federal uniform system of regulation was
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299 (1851).
32 For a more detailed background of state taxation of interstate commerce, see
Golden, The Constitutionality of State Taxation of Energy Resources, 46 ALB. L. REV. 805 (1982).
Regarding the doctrine of per se immunity, "[t]he Constitution was viewed as giving Con-
gress exclusive power over interstate commerce and the absence of federal legislation was
interpreted to evidence a congressional intention that there be no state interference." Id.
at 821.
In the years following the Depression up until the late seventies, the Supreme Court
increasingly upheld state taxes on interstate commerce, yet struggled to devise a practical
standard to apply to all cases in which state taxes were challenged as unconstitutional. A
significant number of challenges came in the area of energy resource taxes. States taxed
the movement of natural resources in interstate commerce to curb depletion by interstate
consumers. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981) (resource
extraction tax); Maryland v. Louisiana, 452 U.S. 725 (1981) (processing tax); Interstate Oil
Pipe Line Co. v. Stone, 337 U.S. 662 (1949) (transport tax).
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placed by a more pragmatic approach which states that "interstate
commerce must bear its fair share of the state tax burden."33 In
Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor34 the Supreme Court struck
down a Connecticut tax imposed for the privilege of doing business
in the state.3 5 The tax was challenged by an out-of-state corporation
whose only contact with the state was the use of its highways.3 6 De-
feating the tax was significant because the tax was fairly apportioned,
did not discriminate against interstate commerce, and the burden on
the taxpayer did not outweigh the benefits accrued by the state.3 7 As
a result, other enterprises which could show their operations were
exclusively interstate were now granted constitutional immunity
from state taxation.38
The immunity afforded interstate enterprises was cut short in
the case of Complete Auto Transit v. Brady.39 In unanimously overrul-
ing Spector, the Court for the first time formulated a test to analyze
the effects of a state tax on interstate commerce. The Court held
that a state tax will withstand a constitutional challenge when four
basic requirements are met: "[tihe tax is applied to an activity with a
substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does
not discriminate against interstate commerce and is fairly related to
the services provided by the State." 40
Given the Court's newly created standard for state taxation of
interstate commerce, the issue arises as to how the test would apply to
state taxation of foreign commerce. The Supreme Court addressed
this issue in Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles. 4 1 A Japanese
shipping line challenged the constitutionality of a California prop-
33 Washington Revenue Dept. v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S.
734, 750 (1978).
Limits on state regulation remained in force, nonetheless, the most notable of which
was "the fundamental principle that... [n]o State, consistent with the Commerce Clause,
may impose a tax which discriminates against interstate commerce by providing a direct
commercial advantage to local business." Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429
U.S. 318, 329 (1976) (quoting Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota,
358 U.S. 450, 457 (1959)).
34 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
35 Id. at 610.
36 The constitutional challenge came from a Missouri trucking company. Id. at 603.
37 Id. at 606-608.
38 The crucial distinction in Spector was that the taxed business was exclusively inter-
state. The Court reasoned that the states could not tax an exclusively interstate business
because the states had, in the commerce clause, "delegated to the United States the exclu-
sive power to tax the privilege to engage in interstate commerce .. " Id. at 608. This
interpretation could logically be applied to foreign commerce as well. Thus, if the Spector
Court had decided Wardair, it probably would have struck down the Florida sales tax as
applied to air carriers engaging exclusively in foreign commerce.
39 430 U.S. 274, 289 (1976). In Complete Auto, a privilege-of-doing-business tax was
assessed by the state of Mississippi on a Michigan trucking corporation which transported
General Motors cars to Mississippi dealers. Id. at 276.
40 Id. at 279.
41 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
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erty tax imposed on the shipping line's cargo containers, appor-
tioned for the period of time the containers were present in the
state.42 The shipping line based its argument on the common law
"home port" doctrine, whereby personal property and instrumental-
ities associated with commerce are to be taxed in full at the domicile
of the owner. 43 Because the home port doctrine lacked a source in
the Constitution, the Court reasoned that it was inappropriate for it
to "rehabilitate" the doctrine as a tool of commerce clause analy-
sis. 4 4 The Court limited its inquiry to the narrower issue whether
foreign based instrumentalities of commerce used exclusively in in-
ternational commerce can be subject to a nondiscriminatory state
property tax.4 5
In resolving this issue, the Court in Japan Line created a two part
foreign commerce clause inquiry which reflected the potential bur-
dens of a state tax on foreign commerce. 46 Applying this analysis, the
42 The apportionment principle states that taxes on one instrumentality may be ap-
portioned among local taxing jurisdictions such that no single jurisdiction may tax in full.
Id. at 447.
Difficulties with the apportionment principle arise where foreign sovereignties are in-
volved. First, there is a problem where "an instrumentality of commerce is domiciled
abroad, [then] the country of domicile may have the right, consistently with the custom of
nations, to impose a tax on its full value." Id. Thus, a state may attempt to impose an
apportioned tax when the carrier has already been taxed in full in the country of domicile.
In addition, there is the problem of devising an international standard of apportion-
ment in the absence of "an authoritative tribunal capable of ensuring that the aggregation
of taxes is computed on no more than one full value. ... Id. at 447-48. The effect of
the multiple tax is clearly inequitable; both sovereigns have the right to tax, but there is no
authoritative body to ensure apportionment will be honored. The Court recognized that
this danger is unique to foreign commerce. "In interstate commerce, if the domiciliary
State is 'to blame' for exacting an excessive tax, this Court is able to insist upon rationali-
zation of the apportionment. As noted above, however, this Court is powerless to correct
malapportionment of taxes imposed from abroad inforeign commerce." Id. at 454 (emphasis
added). "The basis for this Court's approval of apportioned property taxation, in other
words, has been its ability to enforce full apportionment by all potential taxing bodies."
Id. at 447.
43 Id. at 435-436. The "home port" doctrine was substantially eroded in favor of an
apportionment system of tax. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. Where apportion-
ment taxes were upheld, however, the Supreme Court consistently reserved application of
the "home port" doctrine to oceangoing vessels. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 442.
44 Id. at 443. In Wardair, the Supreme Court never actually established whether the
tax on the sale of fuel is a tax on an instrumentality of commerce, a point which the appel-
lant emphasizes. See Brief for Appellant at 21-24, Wardair, 106 S. Ct. at 2369. Apparently,
the instrumentality issue is not crucial in applying the constitutional standard. Nonethe-
less, the question arises whether a tax on the fuel of an instrumentality falls within the
scope of the foreign commerce clause. The Air Agreement expressly prohibits direct taxa-
tion of fuel already owned and "retained on board aircraft of the carriers of one Contracting
Party upon arriving in or leaving the territory of the other Contracting Party," but fails to
mention state sales tax on fuel purchased. Air Agreement, supra note 6, art. XII(l)(b). See
also Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, opened for signature December 7,
1944, art. 24, 61 Stat. 1180, 1186, T.I.A.S. No. 1591.
45 Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 443.
46 Id. at 446. This test is applied by the Court in addition to Complete Auto factors and
represents what the Court considers the distinction between interstate and commerce
clause analyses.
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Court first determined whether the tax created a substantial risk of
multiple taxation,47 and secondly, whether the tax prevented the fed-
eral government from "speak[ing] with one voice when regulating
commercial relations with foreign governments." 48
Having determined that these two requirements were not met,
the Court struck down the property tax as unconstitutional under the
foreign commerce clause. 49 Not only would the foreign-owned con-
tainers be subject to multiple taxation, 50 but the state tax would im-
pair federal uniformity by violating an international agreement which
prohibited such taxation. 51 By adding the two-pronged foreign com-
merce inquiry to the Complete Auto test, the Court recognized that (1)
the effect of a state tax on foreign commerce could differ from its
effect on interstate commerce and (2) there existed a danger that
state regulation of foreign commerce could potentially conflict with
federal foreign policy.
The foreign commerce analysis developed in Japan Line was still
intact when Wardair came before the Supreme Court.52 Wardair at-
tempted to align itself with the Japan Line taxpayer's predicament
while drawing the distinction that the Wardair case "is different in a
very important particular: the violation by the state of Florida not
only 'implicates' national foreign policy, but violates a clear, une-
47 The factors can be applied alternatively to the tax in question; the existence of
either is sufficient to render the tax unconstitutional. Id. at 451.
48 Id. at 449 (quoting Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976)).
4 9 Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 454.
50 The containers were owned, based, and registered injapan, which givesJapan "the
right and the power to tax the containers in full." Id. at 452.
51 The treaty to which the United States, Japan, and 150 other countries are parties,
expressly grants containers "temporary admission free of import duties and import taxes
and free of import prohibitions and restrictions." Customs Convention on Containers,
May 18, 1956, art. I(b), 20 U.S.T. 301, 304, T.I.A.S. No. 6634.
52 Two other foreign commerce clause cases reached the Court prior to its Wardair
decision. In Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1982), the Court upheld
a state tax imposed on a domestic corporation's taxable income, including its income from
interstate commerce. Absent the danger of multiple taxation, the Court only considered
the foreign policy argument that the corporation's foreign trading partners would be of-
fended and retaliate against the nation as a whole. The Court was not willing to interfere
with foreign policy. The Court did, however, use this opportunity to define its limited role
by acknowledging that
[t]his Court has little competence in determining precisely when foreign na-
tions will be offended by particular acts, and even less competence in decid-
ing how to balance a particular risk of retaliation against the sovereign right
of the United States as a whole to let the States tax as they please. The best
that we can do, in the absence of explicit action by Congress, is to attempt to
develop objective standards that reflect very general observations about the
imperatives of international trade and international relations.
Id. at 194.
In Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Director of Taxation of Hawaii, 464 U.S. 7 (1983), the Court
had a much easier case to resolve. The state of Hawaii imposed a tax on the annual gross
income of all airlines, domestic and foreign, operating within the state. Such a tax was
expressly invalidated by § 1513(a) of the Federal Aviation Act. In this instance, "courts
need not look beyond the plain language of the federal statute to determine whether a
state statute that imposes such a tax is pre-empted." Aloha Airlines, 464 U.S. at 12.
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quivocal 'federal directive.' 53
In determining the validity of the tax under the commerce
clause, the Court utilized a three step approach. It examined the lan-
guage of the controlling federal statute, reviewed the statute's legis-
lative history to discern whether Congress intended to pre-empt the
sales tax, and, finally, addressed Wardair's claim that the tax violated
a uniform federal policy. 54
In reaching its decision, the Court in Wardair first examined the
scope of congressional power to regulate air commerce as set forth
in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. 55 The Court concluded that the
language of section 1513(b) of the Act 56 "expressly and unequivo-
cally permitted the States" to levy the aviation fuel tax. 57 Further-
more, other provisions in the Act indicated that this permissive
language applied to foreign as well as interstate air commerce. 58
Next, the Court applied pre-emption analysis. 59 In the absence
of an actual conflict, statutory or otherwise, between federal and
state law, the Supreme Court will not find a state statute unconstitu-
tional unless there is "evidence of a congressional intent to pre-empt
the specific field covered by the state law."'60 The Court was satisfied
that section 1513(b), which does not expressly prohibit state sales
taxes, indicated congressional intent not to prohibit such taxes.61
Although the Court's conclusion that Congress intended for the
states to be free to impose a fuel sales tax might have been sufficient
53 Brief for Appellant at 19, Wardair Can., Inc., v. Florida Dept. of Revenue, 106 S.
Ct. 2369 (1986).
54 Wardair, 106 S. Ct. at 2372-2376.
55 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (1982).
56 Section 1513(b) states in part that "[niothing in this section shall prohibit a State
from the levy or collection of taxes . . .including . . . sales or use taxes on the sale of
goods or services." 49 U.S.C. § 1301, § 1513(b) (1982).
57 Wardair, 106 S. Ct. at 2372. "[Nlowhere in that legislative history is there any
indication that Congress intended to limit the applicability of § 1513(b) to state taxation of
interstate air commerce while prohibiting taxation of foreign air commerce." Id. at 2377
(Burger, C.J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
58 Id. at 2377-2378. The definition of "air transportation" includes "interstate, over-
seas, or foreign air transportation," 49 U.S.C. § 1301(10) (1982).
This is not the first time a Florida sales tax has been challenged by a foreign carrier.
In AirJamaica, Ltd. v. State Dept. of Revenue, 374 So. 2d 575 (Fla. App. 1974), the for-
eign carrier was held liable for a 4% sales tax on food purchased in Florida to be con-
sumed by passengers on international flights originating in Florida. The court held that
state sales taxes were specifically exempted in § 1513 of the Aviation Act, which prohibits
other state taxes on commerce or carriage of persons in commerce. Air Jamaica, 374 So. 2d
at 578.
59 The basis for pre-emption analysis is found in the supremacy clause in article VI of
the United States Constitution. "The Supremacy Clause ... confirms that when Congress
legislates within the scope of its constitutionally granted powers, that legislation may dis-
place state law, and this Court has throughout the years employed various verbal formula-
tions in identifying numerous varieties of pre-emption." Wardair, 106 S. Ct. at 2372.
60 Id.
61 Id.
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to uphold the sales tax under supremacy clause analysis, 62 the Court
went one step further in addressing Wardair's contention that the
sales tax contravened a uniform federal policy. 63 If not for examina-
tion of this issue, the result in favor of the state tax would have been
decided on strict statutory interpretation of the Federal Aviation
Act. 6 4 In resolving this issue, the Court applied the two-part Japan
Line foreign commerce clause analysis to determine the constitution-
ality of the tax. 65
This next level of inquiry was guided by dormant commerce
clause analysis, which gives the judiciary the authority, in areas in
which the federal government has not affirmatively acted, to deter-
mine whether "action by state or local authorities unduly threatens
the values the Commerce Clause was intended to serve."' 6 6 The dor-
mant commerce clause inquiry triggers the four factor test 6 7 formu-
lated in Complete Auto68 and the two additional components of the
Japan Line foreign commerce test.6 9
The Court noted it was undisputed that the sales tax satisfied the
Complete Auto test. 70 Applying the Japan Line test, the Court found
that the danger of multiple taxation did not exist, "since the tax is
imposed only upon the sale of fuel, a discrete transaction which oc-
curs within one national jurisdiction only."' 7 1 The constitutional
question therefore hinged entirely on whether the state sales tax
contravened a particular uniform federal policy. 72
Following its comprehensive pre-emption analysis, the Supreme
Court noted that in the context of bilateral aviation agreements such
as the U.S.-Canadian Air Agreement, the United States has yet to
"deny States the [taxing] power asserted by Florida in this case." 73
The explicit language in the Federal Aviation Act, and the absence of
a more compelling federal policy justification, precluded further
62 See infra note 74.
63 The Court reasoned that it was "plausible that Congress never considered whether
States should be permitted to impose sales taxes on foreign, as opposed to domestic carri-
ers, and therefore we do not rely on the existence of this section [of the opinion] to answer
the Commerce Clause issue raised here by [Wardair] and considered by us below."
Wardair, 106 S. Ct. at 2372.
64 See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
65 Wardair, 106 S. Ct. at 2373.
66 Id. at 2372-73. "[T]he concern in these Foreign Commerce Clause cases is not
with an actual conflict between state and federal law but rather with the policy of uniform-
ity, embodied in the Commerce Clause which presumptively prevails when the Federal
Government has remained silent." Id. at 2373.
67 Id.
68 See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
69 See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
70 Wardair, 106 S. Ct. at 2373. Thus, the sales tax satisfied the constitutional require-
ments under the Complete Auto test in the context of interstate commerce. Id.
71 Id. For example, within a single national jurisdiction, taxes could be apportioned
between local taxing jurisdictions.
72 Id. at 2373.
73 Id. at 2375.
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analysis. 74
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun emphasized the fed-
eral policy of reciprocal tax exemptions on instrumentalities of for-
eign commerce. 75 The dissenting justice claimed that disregarding
this policy in favor of the state statute would both subject the United
States to retaliatory measures from foreign countries and undermine
federal government efforts to achieve this reciprocity in future inter-
national commerce agreements. 76 Although Justice Blackmun con-
ceded that the "United States has not fully succeeded. . .in
transforming its policy [of reciprocity] into law," 77 he nevertheless
concluded that the Supreme Court and not Congress should give the
effect of law to the policy of reciprocity.
Appellant Wardair also claimed that the Air Agreement was evi-
dence of a federal policy to pre-empt the state sales tax.78 The appli-
cable provision is article XII, which states that each party shall
exempt the carriers of the other party from "other national duties
and charges on fuel, . . . and other items intended for use solely in
connection with the operation, maintenance, or servicing of air-
craft."' 79 Clearly, the provision prohibits national taxation of fuel,
but it makes no reference to state taxation.80 On the basis of its judi-
cial interpretation that the Federal Aviation Act and the Air Agree-
ment did not expressly prohibit state sales taxes, the Court upheld
the sales tax."'
The Wardair decision will have a limited impact on state taxation
of foreign commerce. In upholding state taxing power, the decision
makes it constitutionally permissible for a state to levy a sales tax on
74 Id. The Court was satisfied that "the facts presented by this case show that the
Federal Government has affirmatively decided to permit the States to impose these sales
taxes on aviation fuel." Id.
In his concurring opinion, ChiefJustice Burger criticized the circularity of the major-
ity's analysis and argued that since the state tax is valid within the language of § 1513 of
the Aviation Act, no further analysis is required. Id. at 2376 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
The majority, however, considered the pre-emption argument and dormant commerce
clause analysis before concluding "the evidence relied upon by appellant . . . shows also
that in the context of this case we do not confront federal governmental silence of the sort
that triggers dormant Commerce Clause analysis." Id. at 2373.
75 Id. at 2379 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
76 Id. Twenty-five countries officially protested the Florida fuel tax. Brief for Appel-
lant at 30, Wardair Can., Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Revenue, 106 S. Ct. 2369 (1986) (No. 84-
902).
77 Wardair, 106 S. Ct. at 2379 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
78 Id. at 2371.
79 Air Agreement, supra note 6, art. XII. The Court in Container Corp. v. Franchise
Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1982), observed that "the tax treaties into which the United States
has entered do not generally cover the taxing activities of subnational governmental units
as States," implying that there is another element to regulating state taxation. Id. at 196.
80 Wardair, 106 S. Ct. at 2372.
81 Id. at 2375. This represents a significant contrast to the earlier doctrine that the
absence of federal legislation indicated state regulation would be prohibited. See supra note
32 and accompanying text.
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aviation fuel, without regard to whether the carrier engages exclu-
sively in foreign commerce. A mere pattern of federal policy (in this
case, reciprocal tax exemptions) is not enough to compel the
Supreme Court to intervene in an area where Congress has already
acted, even in the unique context of foreign commerce. The Court
requires more convincing evidence of a federal policy. The Wardair
decision suggests a threshold requirement that the federal policy al-
legedly threatened by a state tax at least be explicitly embodied in an
international agreement affecting commerce.
In the context of foreign commerce, the issue whether the
Supreme Court should intervene in foreign policy beyond its polic-
ing role is not addressed. In Wardair, the Court was able to defer to
Congress by determining that the federal government "has at least
acquiesced in state taxation of fuel used by foreign carriers in inter-
national travel."8 2 Because the federal statute affirmatively allows
this type of state tax, the Court chose not to consider "whether, in
the absence of those international agreements, the Foreign Com-
merce Clause would invalidate Florida's tax."8 3 This statement im-
plies the existence. of a more troublesome issue, whether the
Supreme Court has the authority to determine the scope of state
power to tax foreign commerce. The situation could arise in which
the federal statute is silent but the state regulation clearly conflicts
with federal policy. The present Court is unwilling, however, to es-
tablish uniform rules for regulating foreign commerce. Rather, the
Court will police state taxation, guided by the inquiries under the
judicially created interstate and foreign commerce clause tests. Pol-
icy making in the realm of foreign commerce is likely to be left exclu-
sively with Congress.
The Wardair decision sheds little light on the extent to which the
Court will go to strike down a state statute which allegedly conflicts
with federal policy. It appears that in lieu of creating a uniform rule
for state taxation of foreign commerce, the Court will continue to
apply its judicially created commerce clause analysis. Japan Line sug-
gests that even if state regulation of foreign commerce is not statuto-
rily precluded, the federal government's interest in preserving
federal uniformity in foreign affairs is sufficient to render the regula-
tion unconstitutional.8 4 By implication, the Court has the power to
decide, in the absence of a controlling federal statute, whether a fed-
eral policy exists which renders the state regulation unconstitutional.
This question is left open by the Court in Wardair.8 5
If the Court had struck down the sales tax as unconstitutional,
82 Wardair, 106 S. Ct at 2375.
83 Id.
84 Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 448.
85 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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there would be several important implications for interstate com-
merce. A condition of the Complete Auto test is that the state tax must
not discriminate against interstate commerce. 86 Exempting foreign
carriers from the sales tax would discriminate against interstate carri-
ers. The immunity rationale that the foreign carrier engages exclu-
sively in non-intrastate commerce is applicable to interstate carriers
as well. 8 7 Both types of carriers benefit equally from "services that
include not only police and fire protection, but also the benefits of a
trained work force and the advantages of a civilized society."' 88 The
absence of an authoritative tribunal is a strong argument against rec-
ognizing a federal policy of reciprocal tax exemptions. 89 Absent an
express provision in the bilateral agreement, no authoritative body
can ensure that both nations honor an implicit policy of reciprocity.
A different result by the Wardair Court would have constitutionally
prohibited state sales taxes while permitting foreign governments to
impose such taxes freely.
Finally, if the Court had applied the policy of reciprocal tax ex-
emptions to sales taxes, notwithstanding the absence of a congres-
sional mandate, the effect would be to open the door to
constitutional state tax immunity for all instrumentalities of foreign
commerce. 90 This result would disregard the well established doc-
trine that interstate and foreign commerce should "pay its own
way." 91 In light of the recent commerce clause decisions by nearly
unanimous courts,92 such a reversal of the present commerce clause
doctrine, which reserves some taxing power over foreign commerce
to the states, seems unlikely.
A shift in foreign commerce clause analysis is not entirely un-
foreseeable, as history has shown.93 As increases in international
agreements cause the means and methods of commerce to become
more complicated, domestic and international pressure may con-
vince Congress to take affirmative legislative action to establish a
86 Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279.
87 Id. Thus, whether a carrier fueling in the state would have to pay a sales tax would
depend on its ultimate destination. A carrier engaging exclusively in interstate commerce
could argue its ultimate destination was outside Florida and thus it should not be subject
to the tax.
8 8 Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 445.
89 Interestingly, the absence of an authoritative tribunal was an issue in Japan Line.
The Court felt an international tribunal would be needed to ensure that taxes on instru-
mentalities of foreign commerce would be duly apportioned between the taxing nations.
Without the tribunal, the danger of multiple taxation exists. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 447.
90 This could result in tax avoidance justified in the interests of a federal policy. Also,
there are numerous problems in defining what constitutes an "instrumentality" of foreign
commerce. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
91 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
92 See, e.g., Aloha Airlines v. Director of Taxation of Hawaii, 464 U.S. 7 (1983); Japan
Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979); Complete Auto Transit v.
Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
93 See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
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more uniform foreign commerce regulation which might pre-empt
state regulation. The Court has acknowledged that in such a case,
Congress, and not the Supreme Court, is in the better constitutional
position to enact uniform federal rules. 94
RICHARD GABRIEL MINOR
94 In an earlier case, the Supreme Court described the role of Congress in directing
future foreign commerce regulation:
While the freedom of the States to formulate an independent policy in this
area may have to yield to an overriding national interest in uniformity, the
content of any uniform rules to which they must subscribe should be deter-
mined only after due consideration is given to the interests of all affected
states. It is clear that the legislative power granted to Congress by the Com-
merce Clause of the Constitution would amply justify the enactment of legis-
lation requiring all States to adhere to uniform rules for the division of
income. It is to that body and not this Court, that the Constitution has com-
mitted such policy decisions.
Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 280 (1978).
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